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Background: Widespread violence followed the 2007 presidential elections in Kenya resulting in the deaths of a
reported 1,133 people and the displacement of approximately 660,000 others. At the time of the crisis the United
States Agency for International Development-Academic Model Providing Access to Healthcare (USAID-AMPATH)
Partnership was operating 17 primary HIV clinics in western Kenya and treating 59,437 HIV positive patients (23,437
on antiretroviral therapy (ART)).
Methods: This case study examines AMPATH’s provision of care and maintenance of patients on ART throughout the
period of disruption. This was accomplished by implementing immediate interventions including rapid information
dissemination through the media, emergency hotlines and community liaisons; organization of a Crisis Response
leadership team; the prompt assembly of multidisciplinary teams to address patient care, including psychological
support staff (in clinics and in camps for internally displaced persons (IDP)); and the use of the AMPATH Medical
Records System to identify patients on ART who had missed clinic appointments.
Results: These interventions resulted in the opening of all AMPATH clinics within five days of their scheduled
post-holiday opening dates, 23,949 patient visits in January 2008 (23,259 previously scheduled), uninterrupted
availability of antiretrovirals at all clinics, treatment of 1,420 HIV patients in IDP camps, distribution of basic provisions,
mobilization of outreach services to locate missing AMPATH patients and delivery of psychosocial support to 300 staff
members and 632 patients in IDP camps.
Conclusion: Key lessons learned in maintaining the delivery of HIV care in a crisis situation include the importance
of advance planning to develop programs that can function during a crisis, an emphasis on a rapid programmatic
response, the ability of clinics to function autonomously, patient knowledge of their disease, the use of community
and patient networks, addressing staff needs and developing effective patient tracking systems.
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Kenya has a recent history of ethnic violence, with conflicts
arising following the national elections in 1992 and 1997.
In 2007, the presidential election was held on December
27. Three days later the tallying of votes was completed
and the incumbent candidate was announced the winner.
These results were contested by the challenger’s party
with allegations of election malpractice. Widespread
ethnically-related violence broke out on December 30,
2007 and lasted through March 2008 (Figure 1). During
this period 1,133 individuals were killed, 78,000 homes
were destroyed or looted and 660,000 people were
displaced from their homes [1]. An estimated 350,000 of
those displaced were forced to seek refuge in Internally
Displaced Persons (IDP) camps [1-3]. Due to disruptions
in transport, personal displacement, disruption of medical
supply chains and safety issues, many clinics experienced
operational difficulties and patients had trouble accessing
care. As such, in the geographic areas most heavily affected
by violence potential disruptions in patient’s antiretroviral
therapy (ART) became a significant concern [4-7].
Successful delivery of ART in Africa is possible in
adults and children as evidenced by good clinical and
immunological responses [8,9]. However, disruptions in
ART can lead to antiretroviral resistance resulting in
virologic failure and subsequent immunologic and clinical
failure [6-14]. To minimize these negative outcomes,
continued ART delivery is recommended as a part of
HIV services in emergency settings [15,16] and guidelines
have been published [17,18]. However, reports detailing
recommendations for implementation and best practices
to maintain delivery of HIV care in the face of societal
disruptions caused by war, systemic violence or natural
disasters are limited to the experience of a small number
of groups [19-21].
The USAID-Academic Model Providing Access to
Healthcare (AMPATH) Partnership has operated an
HIV care and treatment program in western Kenya
since November 2001. Many clinic sites are located in
geographic areas where the post-election violence was
concentrated. The purpose of this paper is to document
the AMPATH’s response to the crisis and the adaptations
that the program used to provide continuity of care in
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Figure 1 Timeline of 2007 post –election violence and negotiations.learned and to provide recommendations for other ART




In 2001, Indiana University School of Medicine (IUSM)
(Indianapolis, Indiana) and Moi University Faculty of Health
Sciences (Eldoret, Kenya) in collaboration with the Moi
Teaching and Referral Hospital, created AMPATH in
response to the rapidly increasing HIV patient population
being cared for at the Referral Hospital [22]. The goal
of this program was to provide HIV care in both urban
and rural settings in western Kenya. In 2004, with funding
from the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR) and the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), the USAID- AMPATH Partnership
(subsequently identified as AMPATH) was created.
AMPATH Clinics
In December 2007, at the time of the post-election violence,
AMPATH was treating 59,437 HIV infected patients (39%
on ART) at 17 Ministry of Health clinics in western Kenya
(Figure 2). The Eldoret clinic acted as the program hub,
receiving daily deliveries of patient data and laboratory
samples from outlying clinics. Following patient visit
data entry and laboratory specimen processing in Eldoret,
forms and test results were returned to outlying clinics.
Distribution of ART, other medications and food to the
outlying clinics also originated from the main pharmacy
and stocks in Eldoret. The Eldoret clinic itself was
composed of four independently functioning modules
designated as 1a-1d (3 adult clinics and 1 pediatric
clinic housed in a single building) for reporting pur-
poses. The other clinic sites active at the time of the
crisis were located in Mosoriot, Turbo, Burnt Forest,
Chulaimbo, Webuye, Naitiri, Amukura, Kapenguria, Kitale,
Teso, Mt. Elgon, Iten, Kabarnet, Busia, Port Victoria
and Khunyangu (Figure 2). Uasin Gishu clinic opened
for enrollment just prior to the election crisis and was
not included in this report. All of these clinics are located
in western Kenya within four hours by road from the main
clinic in Eldoret. Some clinics operate satellite clinics,
small clinics with limited services open 1–4 days perCandidates 
meet for the 
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Figure 2 AMPATH clinics as of January 1, 2008.
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The clinic in Burnt Forest was the most dramatically
affected, but the clinics in Eldoret, Mosoriot, and
Turbo were also located in the areas of great political
instability and violence.
Burnt Forest clinic
We will describe the response of the AMPATH clinics
as a whole, but because Burnt Forest was the most
profoundly impacted clinic within the system it will serve
as an embedded case study throughout the remainder of
this report. The Burnt Forest Health Center HIV Clinic
was the third rural clinic, founded in 2003. It is located
approximately 30 minutes by road from the main clinic
in Eldoret, and at the time of the election the clinic
cared for 1,747 HIV infected individuals, 57% of whom
were receiving ART. This community has experienced
violence during prior elections, including the 2007 election,
largely due to the mixed ethnic make-up of the population
including tribes supporting the prior president and thosesupporting the opposition party. An estimated 1,320 homes
(housing approximately 5,000 people) as well as numerous
farms and businesses were destroyed during the early
days of the violence [2]. As a result supporters of the prior
president relocated to the town center and opposition
supporters moved to farms on the outside of town. Thus
travel to clinic was complicated by concerns about
having to cross areas held by ethnic groups supporting
the rival party.
Standard of care
At the time of the 2007 election the majority of patients
receiving ART were scheduled for monthly clinic visits
which required, at minimum, contact with a nurse, a
clinician, and a pharmacy technician (or nurse). High risk
patients (CD4 counts ≤ 100 cells/μl at ART initiation or
history of poor compliance) were seen more frequently
(every 1–2 weeks). At each routine clinic visit patients
were provided with a one month supply of antiretrovirals
and prophylactic medications free of charge. On some
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of drugs secondary to special circumstances (planned
travel out of the catchment area, distance from home
to clinic, scheduled holidays, etc.). Laboratory testing
was undertaken per protocol and for clinical indications.
Patients were evaluated for food insecurity at enrollment
and upon referral by a clinician. Supplemental food,
procured through the program’s farm initiative and
the World Food Program (WFP), was provided for the
families of all food-insecure patients.
A member of the clinic’s Outreach Program interviewed
all patients enrolling into the program and documented
their contact information on a locator form that included
the patient’s cell phone number and a map to their home
with key landmarks documented (proximity to schools,
churches, shops, etc.). This information was used to locate
patients who did not return for their clinic appointment
within a designated time frame.
AMPATH Medical records system (AMRS)
The clinics utilize the AMPATH medical record system
(AMRS), an electronic medical records system designed
to collect and manage patient level data, rather than the
aggregate data collected by Kenya’s National Health
Information System. It is used for clinical care, program
reporting and research purposes [23,24]. Paper-based
initial and follow-up forms (adult and pediatric) are
completed by the clinician during a clinic visit. These
standardized forms capture demographics, clinical, laboratory
and pharmacologic information. At the time of the election
all completed forms were being transported to Eldoret
for data entry and once entered were subsequently
returned to the clinics. The AMRS database was not
directly accessible at the outlying clinics.
Structural response
Although the potential for instability in areas serviced by
AMPATH clinics could be anticipated by the history of
election violence, AMPATH clinics had not previously
operated during such outbreaks. As such, planned clinic
closures and distribution of additional ART to patients
were in place to coincide with the Christmas and New
Year holidays as well as the elections, but no formal
structural response plan had been developed. In immediate
response to the disruption caused by the post-election
violence, AMPATH’s administration performed a rapid
assessment of its clinics and the needs of its HIV-infected
patients on January 6, 2008. This resulted in the develop-
ment of a multifaceted disaster response plan consisting of
five primary components: 1) Mobile Clinics and Outreach:
this arm was designed to provide clinical services at the
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps, established a
system to refer patients to the AMPATH clinic operating
closest to their current location, and identify and trackpatients who had missed clinic appointments. 2) Adminis-
tration and Logistics arm: This arm provided physical and
logistical assistance to the teams visiting the IDP camps.
In conjunction with the IU-Kenya program administrative
office (Indiana), this team was also responsible for the
management of emergency recovery funds and procurement
of relief supplies. 3) Media and Information: This arm
designed and facilitated electronic and print media
announcements in national and vernacular languages.
4) Patient and Staff Humanitarian Assistance: This
arm was responsible for assessing and responding to
the socio-economic needs of the distressed patients
and staff. 5) Monitoring and Evaluation arm: This arm
was responsible for tracking and reporting patient care
in the IDP camps, identifying gaps in care within the
IDP camps and developing interventions to address
these gaps. As part of this planning AMPATH decided
not to engage in widespread provision of basic relief
services (i.e. hygiene, sanitation, water, food, security,
immunizations), as many international organizations with
expertise in this area were already responding to the crisis.
In order to implement the response plan, AMPATH
staff divided into five teams with each team assigned to
a response arm. The leadership worked to coordinate
efforts with other governmental and non-governmental
agencies.
Data collection and management
IDP Camps
A “Field Encounter Form – Internally Displaced AMPATH
Patients” was developed and used primarily for patient
encounters in the IDP camps, but also for those patients
displaced to other locations or unable to travel to clinic
due to safety concerns. In addition to the demographic,
clinical and pharmacologic information recorded on the
routine clinical forms, this form collected information on
patient affiliation (AMPATH versus non-AMPATH), IDP
camp location if applicable, status of the patient’s home
(standing versus destroyed) and whether antiretroviral
treatment had been interrupted due to the election crisis.
The standard AMPATH Prescription Form was used to
dispense medications.
AMPATH Clinics
To assess the impact of the post-election crisis on clinic
function, all clinic sites received an “AMPATH Post-Crisis
Clinic Evaluation”. This form was designed to collect data
on the overall function of the clinic including information
on the date of scheduled clinic opening (post-Christmas
and New Year’s holidays), date of actual clinic opening,
number of staff and clinical officers available, ancillary
services available, methods used for patient data collection,
availability of antiretrovirals, and the number of patients
seen by the clinics at one, two and three weeks post-
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mentation of patient visits was requested since some
clinics were unable to complete routine follow-up forms
either due to patient volume or supply issues. As a conse-
quence not all visits were captured in the AMRS during
this period.
Emergency hotline logs
Emergency Hotline calls were answered by a Clinical
Officer (CO) or nurse. For each call they logged the
caller’s name, phone number, area calling from, problem,
advice and their signature.
Burnt Forest clinic patient logs
Utilizing the AMRS, a list of all AMPATH patients enrolled
at Burnt Forest clinic on ARVs was generated. The list
included patient name, age, AMPATH ID number, village/
location, last clinic visit date, expected return date, ART
status (on ART or not on ART) and the patient’s phone
number if known.
Data analysis
Data were extracted from the AMRS for the 6 months
prior to the post election violence in order to determine
the mean number of clinic visits per month at each clinic.
A percentage of the mean patient volume per clinic was
calculated by taking the reported clinic attendance weekly
during each interval surveyed and dividing by the mean
number of clinic visits per week over the prior 6 months.
Simple proportions were calculated for the number of





On January 8, 2008 public service messages were aired on
five local radio stations and published in a daily national
newspaper. Although AMPATH authored and distributed
the initial messages, this task was subsequently taken
over and continued by the Kenyan MOH. The messages
included: all AMPATH clinics are open for care and ARV
distribution; the importance of not missing antiretroviral
doses; the ability of any HIV infected patient to access
antiretrovirals at any AMPATH or Kenyan MOH clinic
by showing their empty pill bottles or clinic appointment
card; emergency hotline numbers for care questions and
directions for correctly stopping medications if unable
to access care. For those patients utilizing infant formula,
information was given on obtaining formula from any
AMPATH clinic, hotline numbers for those unable to
access a clinic and caution against mixing breastfeeding
with other sources of milk.Hotline numbers were published as part of the public
service information provided by the program. Patients
could text or “flash” their phone number to the hotline
numbers and receive a return phone call from a CO or
nurse. The hotline staff logged 212 calls in the three
weeks following the number’s dissemination. Calls
were received from both AMPATH and non-AMPATH
patients and advice was provided on a number of topics,
with the most frequent being how to: obtain antiretroviral
refills, access care at a local hospital, access AMPATH
care and obtain HIV-testing. For those callers seeking
assistance in finding a clinic near their current location,
hotline personnel had a list of 358 hospitals and clinics
located throughout Kenya to which callers could be referred.
Clinic operations
Clinic Re-openings and Staffing
The majority of the twenty clinics (75%) reopened on
their scheduled dates following the holidays (Figure 3).
Of the five clinics that did not open as scheduled, four
were in areas highly affected by violence, including
Burnt Forest. Ultimately, all of these clinics were open
within five days of their planned reopening (two of the
late opening clinics were modules located in Eldoret and
were covered by the other modules at the site). At the
time of reopening, only five clinics (25%) had the full
number of expected non-clinician staff (includes nurses,
pharmacists, nutritionists and social workers) and three
(17%) had the full number of expected COs. However,
by the end of the first week, no clinic was operating with
less than 50% of their staff, nine clinics were operating
with full staff and ten clinics with all clinicians. By the
end of the third week 89% of clinics had returned to full
staff and 68% of clinics had their full complement of
COs. All clinics were considered to be staffed sufficiently to
provide services at pre-violence levels without compromise
of service, thus no subsequent surveys were conducted.
In order to compensate for the decreased number of
COs and staff, patient encounter were brief and in some
cases documentation was minimized.
Burnt Forest clinic staffing
At the Burnt Forest clinic only two staff members (a CO
and a nurse) of the expected seven were able to return to
the clinic on time. In the three days following the outbreak
of violence, these staff members treated any patient
presenting to the clinic regardless of their HIV status.
The majority of patients presented with injuries related
to the violence, such as burns, arrow wounds or lacerations.
Additional staff members were able to return by January 6.
During this time one staff member required escort through
the town to assure his safety and some staff had to quarter
























































Figure 3 Availability of clinical officers and clinic staff at clinic reopenings and in the following weeks.
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The majority of clinics (12/20) had more clinic visits during
their first week open than their mean weekly clinic visits
over the previous six months, leading to an overall patient
volume within AMPATH of 105% (Figure 4). However, of
the seven clinics located in the areas most directly affected
by the violence, six had lower than anticipated patient
volumes during the first week of opening. This trend
continued over the subsequent two weeks with all seven
clinics experiencing a decreased number of visits at week
2, and five of the seven clinics showing decreased volume
at week 3.
Trends in patients’ visits at all AMPATH clinics are
shown in Table 1. The number of previously scheduled
patient appointments was decreased during the period
of the holidays and elections due to the anticipated
travel of patients to their rural homes. In January 2008
the number of missed visits rose to 40.7%, up from an
average 23.1% (21.9-23.9) in the preceding three months.
However, the number of unscheduled visits in January


































Figure 4 Number of patient visits in AMPATH clinics (January –March
each clinic in the first week of each month (January-March) following the e
weekly patient visits during the 6 months prior to the post-election crisis.of 27.2% (26.8-27.7) in the period October to December.
The number of missed patient visits declined during
February and March while the number of unscheduled
visits remained high (36-42%), suggesting patients who
had previously missed visits returned to clinic during
this time.
Burnt Forest patient visits
Burnt Forest reported one CO and one nurse saw 85
patients in the first week they were open. The number
of patients presenting to clinic increased in the second
week (222 patients seen by two COs and one nurse),
but decreased again in the following weeks as this area
remained largely unstable due to continued tribal separation
and sporadic outbursts of violence (Table 2). During the
initial weeks of clinic operations, visits were generally
unscheduled and very short as patients and staff feared
for their safety. Many patients reported the loss of their
antiretrovirals due to fire or rapid evacuation. Patients
experience difficulty in safely moving through town to




2008) following the election crisis. *The number of patients visiting
lection crisis was calculated as the percentage of the mean number of
Table 1 Trends in patient attendance over the period across AMPATH sites and at Burnt Forest clinic
All AMPATH clinics OCT ′07 NOV ′07 DEC ′07 JAN ′08 FEB ′08 MAR ′08
Total scheduled appointments 33613 28183 27165 23259 21598 25891
Total “Missed” Visits (a) 7358 6749 6351 9463 7253 6851
Total “On-time” visits (b) 26255 21434 20814 13796 14345 19040
Total “Unscheduled” visits (c) 9616 8212 7756 10153 10378 10834
Total “Turnover” (Scheduled + Unscheduled visits) (d) 35871 29646 28570 23949 24723 29874
Burnt Forest clinic OCT ′07 NOV ′07 DEC ′07 JAN ′08 FEB ′08 MAR ′08
Total scheduled appointments 1211 1124 960 644 470 517
Total “Missed” Visits (a) 329 372 327 527 180 285
Total “On-time” visits (b) 882 752 633 117 290 232
Total “Unscheduled” visits (c) 454 367 361 307 381 453
Total “Turnover” (Scheduled + Unscheduled visits) (d) 1336 1119 994 427 671 685
KEY:
(a) Those who did not attend on the ‘exact’ appointment date.
(b) Those that attended on the exact appointment date.
(c) Those that attended on dates other than their exact appt. dates (either before or after the scheduled date).
(d) The total number of patients who attended clinic.
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patients in their area to let them know that they could
access care from AMPATH at a satellite clinic (30 km
north) or in Eldoret (40 km northwest). Attendance
trends for Burnt Forest (Table 1) showed a significant
increase in missed visits in January to 81.8%, up from
an average 31.5% (27.2-434.1) in the preceding three
months. However, as was the trend in all AMPATH
clinics, the number of unscheduled patient visits in
January rose to 71.9% from an average 34.4% in October
through December 2007.ART Availability
All clinics reported having adult and pediatric antiretrovirals
available at the time of their reopening. During the
week of January 14–18, two clinics located in areas directly
affected by the violence could not provide a full month’s
supply of antiretrovirals, the amount of ART usually
provided to patients. Both clinics had fully restocked
their medications by January 21. All patients receiving
incomplete supplies of medications were asked to return
the following week in order to receive additional antiretro-
virals. It is noted that during this time both AMPATH and
non-AMPATH patients could seek ART refills from any
AMPATH clinic by showing their pills bottles or knowing
their current regimen.Table 2 Patient return to Burnt Forest Clinic
Mean number of
weekly patient









2008 (% of mean)
274 31 81Impact on documentation
In the weeks following the crisis 7/19 clinics reporting
data on their post-election functioning (all excepting
Mosoriot) experienced disruptions in the normal collection
of patient data due to the need for rapid and streamlined
visits to maintain patient safety and to accommodate
decreased staff numbers. All clinics had been instructed
at minimum to keep a paper log of patient visits. Two
clinics (including Burnt Forest) reported that the only
data collection during the first week of their opening
was the maintenance of a list of patients seen including
their ID numbers. Those two clinics as well as five
others required one to four weeks to fully normalize
their data collection. Due to safety issues on the roads
movement of paper forms to the data management center
in Eldoret was temporarily halted.Tracking missing patients
Although some clinics were able to function normally
throughout the crisis, others had a significant number
of patients who missed appointments and needed to be
located (Figure 4). Using the AMRS, clinics were able to
generate a list of patients receiving ART and those patients
who had missed previously scheduled appointments. The
Outreach Department, with the support of the mobile
clinic and outreach arm, utilized the resulting list toNumber of
documented clinic
visits January 21–25,








2008 (% of mean)
44 68 64
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IDP camps.
Burnt Forest patient tracking
Through the use of phone calls, patient tracking and review
of patient logs from other sites, Burnt Forest clinic was
able to confirm that 494/983 (50%) of their patients on
ART pre-violence had either received care from another
program (3), an AMPATH clinic (369) or an IDP camp
(122) by February 18, 2008. In order to locate those
patients identified as missing, 15 local Community
Healthcare Workers (CHWs) were recruited and asked
to identify and encourage patients in the community
to return to clinic. When a group of patients who did
not feel safe traveling to the clinic was identified within
a catchment area, the CHW arranged for a mobile clinic
team to come to the area and provide antiretrovirals. In
addition, several patients in communities served by the
Burnt Forest clinic became resource persons for care
for patients who were not located in IDP camps. These
individuals would travel to the clinic and carry back supplies
of medications to other patients in their communities,
or they would arrange for local patients to congregate
at their home at pre-arranged times so that Burnt Forest
clinic personnel could deliver medications to many patients
at once within the community.
IDP Camp outreach teams
Team structure
Twenty-three IDP camps fell within or near the catchment
area of the AMPATH clinics. On January 7, 2008 teams
consisting of a staff member from administration, nursing,
community mobilization and psychosocial support made
the first visits to the IDP camps. Based on their observations
they assembled response teams composed of nurses,
outreach workers, psychosocial support staff, nutritionists
and social workers that were sent to the camps to provide
the care and support needed. Mobile teams were each
assigned to several camps and rotated their visits between
camps on a weekly basis. These teams provided ART,
TB treatment, opportunistic infection (OI) prophylaxis
and other support services. A Medical Officer or Clinical
Officer made weekly visits to the camps to provide more
advanced medical care and consultation. In total, teams
saw 1,420 HIV infected individuals in the IDP camps.
Of those, 1,290 were AMPATH patients and 637 were
on ART. Of the 1,420 patients seen, 738 had data captured
by the “Field Encounter Form– Internally Displaced
AMPATH Patients” which was implemented after the
initial rapid response. Of these, 76% were AMPATH
patients, 85% were adults and 77% were female. Two
hundred ninety-one (39%) reported their home had
been destroyed and 137 (19%) reported some interruption
of their ART.Identification of AMPATH patients
Within the IDP camps, in order to gain patient recognition,
staff initially wore shirts that designated them as AMPATH
personnel. This practice was quickly abandoned as staff
realized patients were reluctant to approach them due
to the fear of identifying themselves as HIV positive by
their association with the AMPATH staff. Subsequently,
the teams used word of mouth through peer educators
affiliated with AMPATH and the patients themselves to
spread the news that the team had arrived in the camp.
Distribution of supplies, food and money
In addition to ART, food was distributed to over 1,290
AMPATH patients and their dependents residing in the
IDP camps through AMPATH’s food distribution program.
Minimal supplies such as plastic tarps (250), blankets
(500), cooking utensils (335), sanitary napkins (681) and
underwear (181) were also provided. Whenever possible,
the food and supplies were provided to patients at a
clinic in order to reduce patient stigma, conflicts with
non-AMPATH IDP camp residents and interference
with the missions of other relief agencies. Small amounts
of money were available to patients to facilitate their
transport to the clinics to collect supplies or occasionally
to directly purchase supplies. These funds were made
available from the Recovery Fund, an account established
in January 2008 to receive donations from individuals,
foundations, churches and other entities.
Psychosocial support
Most initial outreach teams had a psychosocial support
staff member. They developed patient support groups
in the camps serving upward of 70 patients at one time.
Individual counseling needs were also addressed with
632 patients receiving over 4,000 counseling sessions in
the IDP camps in the region. Special attention was given
to the counselors themselves, with support sessions
conducted by a mental health specialist and a counseling
supervisor. Emphasis was placed on addressing the indi-
vidual needs of the counselors and providing them with
increased awareness of their own issues so that they could
deal with them appropriately and prevent future burnout.
Burnt Forest and the Nakuru IDP camp
Within 3 weeks of the crisis, Burnt Forest staff was pro-
viding support to patients at 13 different IDP camps and
satellite sites both within the Burnt Forest catchment
and in areas east and southeast of Burnt Forest health
center. One hundred-twenty kilometers southeast of the
Burnt Forest clinic, outside of AMPATH’s catchment
area, one of the largest IDP camps was established in
Nakuru, Kenya. This camp supported 14,000 individuals
[25], including over 100 AMPATH patients. Due to the
large number of AMPATH patients within the Nakuru
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unsafe travel conditions, a nurse and an outreach worker
from Burnt Forest, who were also displaced, were
assigned to the camp full time until September 2008
when all patients were relocated. The two staff members
stationed in this camp were from the Burnt Forest clinic
and had been displaced and were living in the Nakuru
IDP camp. While some patients in this camp obtained
their ARV supplies from the Rift Valley Provincial General
Hospital, Nakuru, the majority received ART and other
logistical support from the AMPATH center in Eldoret.
A physician and CO from Burnt Forest clinic visited the
camp every two weeks to deliver medicines and supplies
and see patients requiring medical consultation.
Staff assistance
A number of AMPATH clinic and ancillary staff were
directly affected by the post-election violence. In some
cases their homes were burned, property was destroyed
or stolen or they were forced to leave their communities.
These staff members were assisted by other staff as
well as through donations given for humanitarian
expenditures. When possible staff members opened
their homes to displaced staff members and their
families until other housing could be secured. Those
staff members identified as being at the highest risk
were assisted in evacuation, in some cases with security
escorts and relocation allowances. Monetary support to
assist with housing, food or transportation could be
requested in writing through the Recovery Fund. Provisions
of food and cell phone airtime were also provided through
this fund. Psychological support was provided to staff, as
counselors met with individuals to discuss issues of fear,
stress, loss or grief. Formal psychosocial education sessions
were held in late January 2008 for approximately 100
staff members to discuss the recent traumatic events,
discuss staff needs and to provide coping strategies to
deal with the trauma and ongoing tensions resulting
from the violence. Debriefing sessions were held by
counselors in 14 departments at the Eldoret AMPATH
center and at the clinics in Burnt Forest and Turbo to
address fears and distrust among co-workers stemming
from the ethnic focus of the post-election violence. In
total 300 staff members received counseling.
Discussion
The instability following the 2007 Kenyan presidential
election is an example of a countrywide disruption that
affected all aspects of life including housing, transportation,
education, commerce and healthcare. In this paper, we
have shown that the AMPATH system maintained a
high level of functioning with minimal gaps in service
delivery. Prompt implementation of a response system
allowed most patients’ uninterrupted access to ART orrapid return to care. We identify lessons learned based
on the experience with the AMPATH response and
recognize system factors that facilitated the success of
that response. We believe that the lessons learned during
the Kenyan post-election crisis may be valuable to other
ART programs located in regions of the world prone to
instability due to political or natural crises.
Lesson 1: A rapid organizational response is critical
Minimizing disruptions to healthcare systems during times
of crisis requires forethought, planning and organization.
In analyzing AMPATH’s response to the crisis a key factor
in the success of the response was the organization’s ability
to rapidly establish a multidisciplinary response team.
As such, one recommendation arising from our experience
is that a Crisis Response Team should be established in
advance as part of the structure of large HIV care and
treatment programs located in potentially unstable regions.
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) similarly designates staff
to prepare for instability [21] and create an Emergency
Preparedness Plan [19]. The Response Team should include
representatives from program leadership as well as key
departments (i.e. pharmacy, social work, psychosocial,
nutrition and outreach). Members should be aware of
their designated roles and responsibilities and alternative
representation should also be designated. Priorities for
patient care should be clearly defined in advance and
strategies for restructuring care delivery to compensate
for staff shortages, increased patient load, potential
supply disruptions and curtailed record keeping should
be addressed.
At the time of a crisis, this team should be immediately
assembled (in person, electronically, or via phone) and tasked
with the rapid assessment of the situation to determine
the impact of the crisis on the safety and stability of
the communities surrounding the healthcare system,
the structural and functional integrity of the clinic(s) and
the extent to which displacement has affected staff and
patients. These assessments should be used to tailor the
team’s response to the crisis, which might include the
use of multi-disciplinary field teams to address patient
needs, public service announcements (address the identified
needs of the specific population) [19-21,26], activation
of an information hotline (utilizing numbers from each
major phone carrier in order to minimize problems with
patient accessibility [19]), activation of community networks,
and establishment of alternative care delivery sites [21].
The developed response mechanism, including key personnel
and procedures, should be reviewed and evaluated on a
regular basis.
Lesson 2: Clinic autonomy and self-sufficiency is indispensable
The ability of the AMPATH clinics to function autono-
mously in the early period of the crisis was key to the
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transport, communications, and issues related to safety.
This finding supports the recommendation that within a
multi-clinic system the capacity for some autonomous
operations, for at least limited time periods, should be
developed in the individual clinics. This would include
ensuring the staff members are cross trained to take
additional or alternative roles [19-21], maintenance of
at least one month stock of supplies and medications,
and ensuring that emergency funds are available at the
clinic to meet unforeseen operating costs. The optimal
quantity of medications and supplies to be stocked requires
local assessment of patient volume, storage capacity,
anticipated duration of disruption(s), and the program’s
capacity for alternative means for drug/supply delivery.
MSF has made similar recommendations for maintaining
increased drug supplies at clinics and distributing extended
supplies of patient medications when instability is antici-
pated as was done by AMPATH practitioners, particularly
in Burnt Forest, at the time of the 2007 Kenyan elections
and holidays [19,20]. In times of unanticipated crisis, MSF
had recommended the rapid distribution of pre-prepared
“runaway stock” (1–3 months of ART and OI prophylaxis)
to patients [17]. In addition, clinics should be given license
to adjust patient flow and documentation in order to
accommodate reduced staff numbers, and in some cases,
increased patient numbers. Streamlining of patient visits and
the minimization of paperwork as used by both AMPATH
and MSF can [19] prevent disruptions in patients’ ART at
the reasonable expense of limited data collection.
Lesson3: Patient knowledge of their HIV status and
treatment regimen is necessary
Promoting patient self-sufficiency in seeking care is also
important. Patients should receive ongoing education to
ensure that they are familiar with the status of their HIV
disease (CD4 count, viral load, history of OIs) and know
the component drugs of their ART regimen. MSF has
utilized patient “passports” that include previous and
current ART regimens and any known side effects [19].
AMPATH currently prints a “Clinical Summary” for health
providers at each patient visit that shows the patient’s
current ART regimen and OI medications, current and
past problem list and a chronological listing of the patients
weights, hemoglobin counts, CD4 counts, viral loads and
SGPTs. As this information is already available, it could
be provided to patients at each scheduled visit with
instructions to keep it in a safe place such that the
patient could present it to other providers if needed
in the future.
Lesson 4: Patient and community networks are essential
At Burnt Forest the strong ties between the community,
including both patients and other community members,and the clinic was found to be invaluable to ensuring
that patients received uninterrupted supplies of ART. The
recommendation based on this finding is that clinics/ART
treatment programs develop significant relationships with
their surrounding communities. This could include estab-
lishing patient contact lists and facilitating self-forming
patient groups to aid communication between the clinic
and the community of patients both for the enhancement
of routine care and to facilitate rapid communication
during times of disruption. Clinics/programs utilizing
CHWs or expert patients will want to consider how to
incorporate these key members of the community into
their crisis response plan. As emphasized previously by
MSF, each clinic/program must project an image of
neutrality in its healthcare delivery in order to maintain
the support of the community [21], especially when there
is discord among community members as was seen in
Burnt Forest.
Lesson 5: Ensuring staff security and access to basic
needs is fundamental
The Kenyan post election violence impacted the full cadre
of staff working in the AMPATH clinics. Staff members
experienced displacement, food insecurity, transportation
issues, and security concerns. By addressing these issues
AMPATH facilitated the return of staff to functional
positions within the system. For individuals in targeted
ethnic groups in high risk areas, that included relocation
to positions outside their primary clinic. For others it
required finding alternative housing, providing funds to
replace damaged or stolen property, or to buy food. This
finding supports the recommendation that programs make
arrangements for rapidly assessing staff needs and then
provide with a plan to meet those needs either internally
or by establishing agreements with organizations whose
missions can provide for those needs.
Lesson 6: The ability to rapidly identify and track all
patients requiring ART is key
At Burnt Forest, in particular, many patients were unable
to access the clinic due to security issues and/or displace-
ment. The AMPATH electronic medical record (EMR)
system was a critical tool in identifying patients who
had not returned for their scheduled appointments and
providing a list of patients that were at risk for ART
disruptions. This finding leads to the recommendation
that programs should have the capacity to rapidly generate
lists of patients who have not returned for care within a
specified period of time. In the case of ART care systems/
clinics with EMRs this means that the programming
to generate such lists should be developed prior to a
potential crisis and be ready to be utilized when needed.
In the case of programs without EMRs, paper based
systems for identifying patients at risk for ART disruption
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of such lists is only useful if the program maintains up
to date contact information on all patients. Contact
information should include cell phone number(s) if
available as well as the patient’s complete address. In
countries where street addresses are uncommon a detailed
description of how to get to a patient’s house including
a map should be maintained in the patient’s file.
Decentralization of EMR capacity to local clinic sites
would improve the ability for individual clinics to
track patients, verify treatment regimens, and monitor
treatment locally. AMPATH is currently working to
decentralize EMR operations to all clinics.
Some clinic systems have designated staff (outreach
workers, trackers, etc.) and systems for locating patients
who have not returned to clinic within a specified time
frame. These individuals should be included in a crisis
response team and provide insight into the development
of plans to contact patients at times of social disruptions.
Clinics without this capacity should identify and train staff
and develop systems for providing outreach to patients
who are at risk of ART disruption. This may include the
use of patient networks as described above.
Study limitations
Although the majority of patients were able to return to
care in a timely manner, this case study is limited in its
ability to quantify the actual proportion of patients that
had interruptions in care. In order to determine this
number, all patients actively receiving ART prior to the
elections would need to be known and then compared
against a list of all patients returning to care within a
specified amount of time following the elections. However,
patients’ scheduled return dates were not consistently
recorded in their charts and may have varied during
this time due to the holidays and upcoming elections.
Patients may have returned to clinic before or after their
scheduled date with an unknown interruption in ART.
Furthermore, due to the disruptions in some clinics, only
pharmacy logs were kept to record ART distribution with
no formal encounter form filled to log a patient’s visit.
Furthermore, preparations for the holidays and elections
affected the average number of days that drugs were given
for patients at the time of the election. Drug refills for
patients normally attending the most affected clinics is
difficult to determine as patients were able to receive
refills at other clinic sites, ancillary clinics, non-AMPATH
clinics and IDP camps.
In the two months following the election specific
documentation of the location and status of 50% of the
patients on ART at Burnt Forest was recorded. Individual
patient tracking was then discontinued and specific patient
level data is not available to allow for a true assessment
of how many of the remaining patients were lost tofollow-up due to the crisis. An analysis of aggregate
data from AMRS of the patient cohort starting ART
prior to the crisis was done. It showed that during the
two years immediately following the crisis the rate of
patients lost to follow-up at Burnt Forest was greater
than AMPATH in its entirety (where the majority of
patients were not affected by the crisis) by 3-4% but
equalized by 2010.
This case report highlights the response of the AMPATH
HIV clinic system to the crisis following the 2007 Kenyan
elections. We acknowledge that the experiences and
responses documented here may not be applicable to
all settings or crisis situations.
Conclusion
This case study highlights the challenges in delivering
healthcare, specifically ART, during a time of social dis-
ruption. This case illustrates the importance of advance
planning to develop programs that can function during a
crisis and emphasizes the need for a rapid programmatic
response, ability of clinics to function autonomously,
ensuring patients are knowledgeable about their HIV
status and treatment, use of community and patient
networks, addressing staff needs and developing effective
patient tracking systems.
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